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Abstract 
 
 
This article revisits the claim, largely accepted within the 
sociological community for over thirty years now, that classical 
sociologists had no clear concept of the nation-state and thus 
were unable to conceptualise its rise, main features and further 
development in modernity. In contradistinction to this standard 
view, which in current debates receives the name of 
methodological nationalism, I advance a re-interpretation of 
classical sociology’s conceptualisation of the nation-state that 
points towards what can be called the opacity of its position in 
modernity. Marx understood the historical elusiveness of the 
nation-state as he believed that it had already passed its 
heyday as political struggles were fought between Empires and 
the Commune. Weber captured the sociological equivocations that 
arose from the historical disjuncture between the nation and the 
state. And Durkheim, finally, tried to come to terms with the 
nation-state’s normative ambiguity via the immanent tension 
between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. The conclusion is that, 
even if not thoroughly unproblematic, classical sociologists 
were able to avoid the reification nation-state’s position in 
modernity precisely because they were not obsessed with 
conceptualising modernity as such from the viewpoint of the 
nation-state. 
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In an influential article published in the pages of the British 
Journal of Sociology in 1983, Anthony D. Smith gave concise 
expression to an argument that until very recently was still 
regarded as the definitive assessment of sociology’s inability 
to come to terms with the nation-state’s position in modernity. 
From its inception, Smith argues, sociology would have fallen 
under the trap of ‘methodological nationalism’; the idea that 
the nation-state was the natural and necessary representation of 
the modern society. In his view, this theorem would hold true 
not only for the works of classical sociologists but also for a 
great deal of twentieth century sociology. In his own words: 
 
It is, therefore, as if its own thoroughly evolutionist 
background and impetus made sociology, as the study of laws 
of social order and social change, unable to distance itself 
sufficiently from its own basic premises, which are also 
those of nationalism, and from so essential an aspect of the 
modern laws of change, i.e., the growth of nations. If this 
is the case, then it would go far in explaining why nations 
and nationalism were so long accepted as a sociological 
“given”; and why the study of society was always ipso facto 
the study of the nation, which was never disentangled as 
separate dimension or issue (…) the difficulty for a 
discipline so impregnated with the selfsame assumptions as 
those held by its object of study, to stand back and realize 
its historical peculiarity, has prevented sociologists till 
quite recently from devoting the attention to that object 
which it clearly deserves; with the result that the growth 
of nations and nation-states, and of their ethnic core from 
which most sociologists are normally recruited, are topics 
and features of society ‘taken-for-granted’; they are part 
of the basic furniture of the mind carried as much by 
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students of society as by any other of its members (Smith 
1983: 26) 
 
Smith was by no means alone in putting this case forward at the 
time. Rather, he was giving systematic expression to a number of 
similar views that had already denounced sociology’s excessive 
reliance on national categories (Giddens 1973, 1985, Martins 
1974, Smith 1979). Indeed, this standard view is still shared by 
many of the leading scholars in different fields of the 
sociological spectrum. For instance, a similar assessment of 
classical social theory’s self-defeating methodological 
nationalism has been advanced by a number of scholars doing 
exceptional research into the rise and recent transformations of 
nations and nationalism (Mann 1986, 2004, Wimmer and Schiller 
2002); by some of the most interesting and sharp social 
theorists (Calhoun 1997, Luhmann 1997, Smelser 1997) and indeed 
by those writers for whom the rise of globalisation means also 
the decline of the nation-state (Albrow 1996, Bauman 1998, Beck 
2000, Castells 1997, Urry 2000).  
 
My starting point in this piece is therefore that for a 
discipline that is so obsessed with permanently revisiting its 
own past – and sociology has grown accustomed to disagreeing on 
pretty much everything in the process – it is rather surprising 
that this standard view has remained largely unchallenged for 
over thirty years now. The sociological community became used to 
the idea that no gains for our substantive comprehension of the 
nation-state would come from revisiting the works of that 
generation of social theorists we now treat the founding figures 
of sociology. But the question of social theory’s alleged as 
well as real methodological nationalism has proved much more 
complicated than previously granted (Chernilo 2006). And its 
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implications have proved relevant not only for the way in which 
we currently reconstruct and reassess the past of sociology but 
more importantly for our substantive comprehension of the 
nation-state as a modern socio-political arrangement (Chernilo 
2007a). The time has come for us to revisit this consensus and, 
in the spirit of renovating our understanding of both the 
nation-state and classical sociology, the aim of this article is 
to re-interpret the relationship between the two. Because 
classical sociology was able to grasp the historical elusiveness 
(Marx), sociological equivocations (Weber) and normative 
ambiguity (Durkheim) of the nation-state it can now helps us 
understand the opacity of the nation-state’s position in 
modernity. 
 
In so far as this article attempts to grasp what previous 
writers have understood about the nation-state, the questions 
being raised here belong also to the field of intellectual 
history. Yet, its main thrust remains sociological as the 
article concentrates on how the past of social theory and of the 
nation-state helps us make sense of the present transformations 
of the nation-state and the challenges they pose to social 
theory. The ultimate sociological question I am interested in 
pursuing is how to comprehend, as best as we possibly can, the 
history, main features and legacy of the nation-state in 
modernity. 
 
 
Karl Marx. Understanding the historical elusiveness of the 
nation-state. 
 
We may start this reconstruction with the works of the young 
Karl Marx. In the context of his dispute with the young 
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Hegelians, Marx criticised ‘the fetishism of the state’ which 
finds in ‘Hegel’s idealism its ultimate expression’ (Fine 2002: 
65). Marx argued that Hegel described ‘a particular state of 
affairs (like hereditary monarchy, a reformed bureaucracy, a 
bicameral parliament, the incorporation of the judiciary within 
the executive) and assigned to it the logical attributes of 
universality. Hegel idealised empirical reality, turning the 
existing state into the embodiment of the universal’ (Fine 2002: 
68-9). The work of Hegel, says Marx (1978b: 59), represents the 
highest and most profound critique of ‘the modern state and of 
the reality connected with it’. This critique centres on Hegel 
because of his role in the idealisation of the Germans’ 
understanding of the country’s situation 
 
In politics, the Germans have thought what other nations 
have done (…) the status quo of the German political system 
expresses the consummation of the ancien régime, the thorn 
in the flesh of the modern state, the status quo of German 
political science expresses the imperfection of the modern 
state itself, the degeneracy of its flesh (Marx 1978b: 59-
60) 
 
Marx criticises this diagnostic of Germany in which the country 
is taken as self-sufficient and without consideration of broader 
social processes all over the world. Marx’s critique of Hegel is 
the critique of turning the project of a German nation-state 
into a form of religion; Marx’s argument on Germany, as well as 
his general critique of Hegel’s idea of the state, pointed in 
the direction of a critique which involved transcending the 
‘methodologically nationalistic’ framework and assumptions with 
which, in his view, Hegel – and German political philosophy in 
general – endorsed the German state. 
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Similarly, in On the Jewish Question, Marx discusses the limits 
of what can be achieved in the transformation of social life 
when the political form of the modern state is taken as the 
ultimate framework of social and political relations. Marx’s 
(1978a: 35) argument is that political emancipation is a 
necessary stepping stone in the process of modern society 
reaching its own limits: ‘political emancipation certainly 
represents a great progress. It is not, indeed, the final form 
of human emancipation, but it is the final form of human 
emancipation within the framework of the prevailing social 
order’. Whilst the idea of political emancipation makes possible 
the rise of the modern form of socio-political relations – 
represented in the division between the state and civil society 
– the critique of political emancipation exposes the limitations 
of these social relations and political order. The ultimate 
problem with the project of political emancipation is not that 
it fails to transcend the actual form of the state but that it 
actually reinforces that same state by consecrating the 
separation of civil society from the state.  
 
Marx argues that the political programme that aims at the reform 
of the modern state within the limits of that state fails to 
grasp not only its historical and contradictory character but 
also the ultimate source of alienation and inequality of modern 
social life. The project of human emancipation is based on the 
transcendence of the bourgeois state and the contradictory form 
of reproduction of social life upon which that state is founded: 
civil society. Rather than saying to the Jews, as Bauer did, 
‘you cannot be emancipated politically without emancipating 
yourselves completely from Judaism’, Marx (1978a: 40) argues the 
other way round ‘it is because you can be emancipated 
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politically, without renouncing Judaism completely and 
absolutely, that political emancipation itself is not human 
emancipation’. Marx’s claim – the argument refers to the Jews 
but it certainly applies not only to them – is twofold. On the 
one hand, Marx argues that, even within the framework of the 
modern (nation) state, political rights should be independent of 
religious or cultural differences. Marx criticised Bauer on the 
grounds that he attached the recognition of political rights 
within the state to the alleged abolition of these differences. 
On the other hand, Marx realised that the actual result of that 
‘abolition’ can only be the imposition of one privileged 
national (German) and/or religious (Christian) form of identity 
upon other minority groups. Marx’s critique of political 
emancipation is in this sense a critique of making the nation 
the basis for the recognition of political and civil rights 
within the state (Marx 1978a: 29-30). For Marx, then, the young 
Hegelians hypostatise the modern nation-state as the most 
rational form of socio-political life. They take the bourgeois 
form of the state as something that state is not: the final 
stage in the historical development of modernity.  
 
Indeed, according to Simon Clarke (1991: 58), a similar argument 
has been made in relation to Marx’s critique of Political 
Economy: ‘Marx’s critique of Hegel can be translated immediately 
into a critique of political economy because it is a critique of 
their common ideological foundations’. I have no space to enter 
into this here in any detail but let me just mention that, in 
Grundrisse, Marx (1973: 172) argues that for the determination 
of the actual processes of production and exchange, 
‘individual’, ‘local’, ‘national’ and ‘global’ aspects are all 
to be integrated and taken into account. Marx (1973: 227-8) says 
that the first section of his proposed study of economic of 
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relations ‘as relations of production’ must include, first, the 
study of the ‘exchange of the superfluous’, second, ‘the 
internal structure of production’, third ‘the concentration of 
the whole in the state’, fourth ‘the international relation’. 
Finally, at the level of the world market (…) production is 
posited as a totality together with all its moments, but within 
which, at the time, all contradictions come into play. The world 
market then, again, forms the presupposition of the whole as 
well as its substratum’. Not only in its form but also in its 
very content, therefore, Marx’s critique of German political 
philosophy and British political economy can be read as 
rejection of taking the nation-state as the last development of 
modern socio-political life in modernity. The strong claim to 
universalism underlying Marx’s historical materialism works as 
antidote against the reification of the nation-state’s position 
in modernity (Chernilo 2007b).  
 
One can still pursue the argument of the historical elusiveness 
of the nation-state in Marx’s work a bit further. In one well-
known formulation of the Communist Manifesto, the argument 
revolves around the tension between nationalisation and 
cosmopolitisation that capitalism brings with it 
 
All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of 
ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept 
away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can 
ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy 
is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober 
senses his real condition of life and his relations with his 
kind (Marx and Engels 1976: 487, emphasis added)  
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What immediately precedes and follows this paragraph, it must be 
remembered, is nothing but Marx’s admiration for the way in 
which the bourgeoisie has led to the rise of a world market, 
world literature and world-wide means of communication (Berman 
1982). In relation to the nation-state, however, it worth 
highlighting the fact that Marx is already aware of how all new 
modern (capitalist) social relations are obsolete before they 
mature: capitalism forms and erodes the nation-state in equal 
measure even before it is fully formed. The nation-state is an 
impossible form of socio-political arrangement because all 
nations become ‘antiquated’ they can create ‘their own’ states. 
The contradiction Marx exposes here is that, although the 
nation-states is a forward-looking project, it is at the same 
time outdated even before it can actually establish itself in 
the present. 
 
This interpretation finds further support in Marx’s latter 
writings. In The Civil War in France – originally written in 
1870-1 – the nation-state also fails to settle in as the 
organising centre of modernity and it now disappears behind the 
struggle between the French Empire and the Commune. It is 
remarkable how Marx expressed in that text that current 
political struggles were to be fought between the Empire and the 
Commune because it is as though the nation-state had already 
passed away! On the one hand, Marx presents imperialism as ‘the 
most prostitute and the ultimate form of State power which 
nascent middle-class society had commenced to elaborate as a 
means of its own emancipation from feudalism’ (Marx 1978c: 631). 
In the Europe of that time, ‘monarchy’ was just ‘the normal 
incumbrance and indispensable cloak of class-rule’ (Marx 1978c: 
634). On the other hand, Marx (1978c: 631) also argued that, in 
opposition to the Empire did not stand any form of nation-state; 
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rather ‘[he direct antithesis to empire was the Commune’. And in 
fact, for the middle classes ‘there was but one alternative – 
the Commune, or the Empire – under whatever form it might 
reappear’ (Marx 1978c: 636). The nation-state, as a form of 
political organisation in capitalism, is being formed and 
dissolved, constituted and pulled apart, in the same process of 
capitalist development.  
 
Marx regarded the nation-state as one element within a much 
wider and complex web of modern socio-political relations. His 
argument is not only that the nation-state needs to be 
understood within the broader picture of capitalist social 
relations but also that political relations themselves can take 
different forms in capitalism such as Empires or the Commune. 
Yet, Marx did not argue for a contingent link between capitalism 
and the nation-state either. Rather, he subjected the nation-
state to the dialectics of formation and dissolution of social 
relations with which capitalism has made itself famous. The 
nation-state is in this sense no different from all other forms 
of social relations that, in capitalism, become antiquated 
before they can ossify. The nation-state is being created and 
dissolved, established and pulled apart in the same way as 
everything else in capitalism is.  
 
Max Weber: Battling with the sociological equivocations of the 
nation-state. 
 
Let me continue this exploration into the nation-state’s 
position in modernity with Weber’s understanding of the nation-
state. Weber’s (1994b: 310-1) concept of the state, based as it 
is on the question of the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical violence, is very well-known indeed. Much less noticed, 
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however, is the fact that Weber does not conceptualise what is 
particular of the modern state in relation to the monopoly of 
legitimate violence. Rather, the core of Weber’s definition of 
the modern state is the fact that the state’s duties are 
fulfilled through particular means. Weber understands the modern 
state within his broader comprehension of the processes of 
bureaucratisation of modern social life which, in the case of 
the state, finds expression in the fact that the state’s 
administrative staff is separated from the means with which to 
fulfil their roles. Thus Weber (1994b:  314-5):  
 
All forms of state order can be divided into two main 
categories based on different principles. In the first, the 
staff of men (…) own the means of administration in their 
own right (…) In the other case the administrative staff is 
“separated” from the means of administration, in just the 
same way as the office-worker or proletarian of today is 
“separated” from the material means of production within a 
capitalist enterprise (…) the development of the modern 
state is set in motion everywhere by a decision of the 
prince to dispossess the independent, “private” bearers of 
administrative power who exist along him, that is all those 
in personal possession of the means of administration and 
the conduct of war, the organisation of finance and 
politically deployable goods of all kinds 
 
Weber conceptualises the state with total independence of the 
nation. Similar to what Marx had done, as we just saw, he 
locates the idea notion and main features of the modern state 
within the broader social theory of modernity in which they were 
ultimately interested. Just as we could not get a sense of Marx’ 
idea of the nation-state beyond an understanding of capitalism’s 
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main features, Weber’s concept of the state makes little sense 
beyond his wider view of the bureaucratisation of modern social 
life and the tragedy of modern culture (C. Turner 1992). The 
problem becomes all the more vexing because it is not only that 
the concept of the state is independent from the nation, but the 
nation itself is ‘one of the most vexing, since emotionally 
charged concepts’ to be found in the sociological lexicon (Weber 
1978: 395). Above all, Weber was sceptical as to whether the 
nation could effectively be formalised. ‘If the concept of 
“nation” can in any way be defined unambiguously’, he says, it 
can just refer to ‘a specific sentiment of solidarity’ of a 
certain group of people ‘in the face of other groups’ (Weber 
1970: 172).  
 
In trying to explain causally the emergence of nations, Weber 
says that there is no single factor that can fulfil that role so 
that no conclusive explanation of their development can be 
given. He made clear to the reader the substantial problems he 
faced in framing his inquiry and expanded on the difficulties of 
grasping what a nation is. He laboriously tried to attach the 
definition of the nation to other aspects of social life: ‘[t]he 
concept of “nationality” shares with that of the “people” (Volk) 
– in the “ethnic” sense – the vague connotation that whatever is 
felt to be distinctively common must derive from common descent 
(Weber 1978: 395). But this ambiguity is only the beginning of 
the problem because nations do not have ‘an economic origin’; 
they are not ‘identical with the “people of a state”’ neither 
are they ‘identical with a community speaking the same language’ 
and indeed ‘and one must not conceive of the “nation” as a 
“culture community”’. Furthermore, ‘a common anthropological 
type (…) is neither sufficient nor a prerequisite to found a 
nation (…) “national” affiliation need not be based upon common 
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blood’ so that ‘the sentiment of ethnic solidarity does not by 
itself make a “nation”’. Finally, in relation to classes, the 
claim is that an ‘unbroken scale of quite varied and highly 
changeable attitudes towards the idea of the “nation” is to be 
found among social strata’ (Weber 1970: 171-8).  
 
The general tone of Weber’s sociological reflections on the 
nation is above all one of scepticism. The clause with which he 
begins this discussion states that the nation is ‘located in the 
field of politics’ only ‘in so far as there is at all a common 
object lying behind the obviously ambiguous term “nation”’ 
(Weber 1970: 176). And equally ‘the concept [of the nation] 
seems to refer – if it refers at all to a uniform phenomenon – 
to a specific kind of pathos which is linked to the idea of a 
powerful political community (…) such a state may already exist 
or it may be desired’ (Weber 1978: 398). Eventually, Weber 
accepted the association between nations and states only ‘if one 
believes that it is at all possible to distinguish national 
sentiment as something homogeneous and specifically set apart’ 
and, even if that were the case ‘one must be clearly aware of 
the fact that sentiments of solidarity, very heterogeneous in 
both their nature and their origin, are comprised within 
national sentiments’ (Weber 1970: 179). Class structure, power 
politics, common memories, religion, language and racial 
features are all only imperfectly associated with the nation and 
none of them can really give us the just impression of what a 
nation is and how its association with the state can adequately 
be conceptualised. 
 
So far we have hardly found any trace of logical necessity in 
Weber’s conceptualisation of the nation. This impression is 
reinforced at the historical level as we are told that the 
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‘national sentiment is variously related to political 
associations, and the “idea” of the nation may become 
antagonistic to the empirical scope of given political 
associations. This antagonism may lead to quite different 
results’ (Weber 1970: 175). The political expression of national 
sentiments produces different political results in different 
groups. Weber refers to how Spaniards, Poles, Croats, Russians 
and Germans have all had to come to terms with an ‘idea of the 
nation’ which is ‘entirely ambiguous’ for the purposes of 
sociological generalisation (Weber 1970: 175). Nations want to 
form powerful states but, if successful, they become victims of 
their own success: imperialism is the representation of the 
disintegration of the nation-state because power politics pushes 
the state beyond the limits of the nation. Interestingly, the 
opposite case is also possible: ‘there are cases for which the 
term nationality does not seem to be quite fitting’ and Weber 
argues that Belgian or Swiss could not be conceived of as 
nation-states because ‘have forsaken power’ (Weber 1978: 397). 
If in the case of imperialism nation-states explode as victims 
of their own success, in this latter case nation-states implode 
due to the lack of power and prestige politics that can maintain 
their own project as independent nation-states. In either case, 
nation-states are unlikely to survive qua nation-states due to 
either their success or their failure. So, even when Weber 
recognises that the ‘“nation state” has become conceptually 
identical with “state” based on common language’ he would do so 
by emphatically stating at the same time that ‘in reality, 
however, such modern nation states exist next to many others 
that comprise several language groups’ (Weber 1978: 395). 
 
The more abstract reflections on nations and nation-states we 
have just discussed illuminate – and are illuminated by – 
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Weber’s views on the relationships between the ideas of the 
Reich and the nation-state in Germany at the turn of the century 
(Mommsen 1984). Weber was well aware of the ambiguities that 
underpinned the formation of the Reich. It has been argued that, 
in the Germany of Weber’s time, the Reich was neither the same 
as, nor completely different from, a nation-state. On the one 
hand, ‘the new Reich saw itself as a nation-state’ (Langewiesche 
2000: 122). The Reich presented itself as a nation-state and 
developed from an idealised image of how a German nation-state 
ought to be. On the other hand, however, there seems to have 
been an equally clear awareness on the fact that the German 
nation-state was more a project than a reality. The argument was 
that a nation had not yet been formed the Reich ‘did not fully 
absorb the old imperial nation, and at the same time expanded 
beyond the ethnic nation’ (Langewiesche 2000: 122). We totally 
miss Weber’s historical context if we overlook the differences 
and even tensions between the ideas of the Reich and the nation-
state and it is only in making this inappropriate move that the 
foundation of the Reich can be taken to mean the foundation of 
the German nation-state. The situation of Germany at the time 
seemed to have taught Weber that the ‘German nation-state’ did 
not exist in actuality and may have not been even desirable at 
that particular moment. In fact, an Empire was in his view the 
best political form for Germany at the time (Weber 1994a). A 
nation-state, then, was a project instead of an already made 
solution; it was difficult to establish and, more important for 
my argument here, it was not the only, necessary, or even the 
best answer for all political struggles. The tension between 
imperialism and nationalism in Weber’s political writings, 
although very problematic in itself, points sociologically in 
the direction of a critique methodological nationalism. 
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Emile Durkheim: Facing the normative ambiguity of the nation-
state. 
 
The historical and sociological issues raised respectively by 
Marx and Weber find normative expression in Durkheim’s (1915) 
Germany above all, a little pamphlet that was written to 
explicate the causes of the First World War to the French 
public. Durkheim (1915: 44-5) takes the work of Heinrich 
Treitschke as the ultimate representation of the development of 
the German mentality in which ‘a morbid hypertrophy of the will’ 
expresses itself as an ‘attempt to rise “above all human forces” 
to master them and exercise full and absolute sovereignty over 
them’. With this, Durkheim (1915: 4) says, Germany has departed 
from ‘the great family of civilized peoples’ and therefore it 
would be not only in France’s interest, but in the interest of 
civilisation itself, to oppose the expansion of Germany. 
Durkheim rejected the realist ground on which Treitschke 
asserted the role of the state –the ‘State is power’ (Durkheim 
1915: 19) – as well as the normative consequence Treitschke drew 
from it: ‘the State is not under the jurisdiction of the moral 
conscience, and should recognise no law but its own interest’ 
(Durkheim 1915: 18).  
 
The opposition to Treitschke’s conception of the state was that 
no genuinely universalistic conception of morality can be 
grounded on state or national premises. Morality, Durkheim 
(1915: 23) argues, is based on ‘the realisation of humanity, its 
liberation from the servitudes that belittle it’. Durkheim 
(1915: 24) understands that core to the Christian tradition is 
the fact that ‘there are hardly any great divinities who are not 
to some extent international’. The religion of humanity in which 
Durkheim is interested does not fuse with the state nor with the 
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nation. Rather, all efforts must be made to transcend the 
possible – but by no means inevitable – paradox between a 
commitment towards human values and patriotism towards one’s own 
nation. 
 
Durkheim favoured pacifism and internationalism for both 
sociological and normative arguments. In relation to the former, 
the industrial revolution played a major role; pacifism has to 
be pursued in order to avoid the ‘“wasteful” expenditure of war’ 
(Layne 1973: 99): industrial development, technological 
improvements and prosperity have arisen together and require the 
pacific reorganisation of Europe (Durkheim 1959: 130-1). On the 
normative side, there is here the – Kantian – ‘perpetual-peace’ 
type of pacifism: ‘the evolution of modern society has produced 
a wider horizon for human consciousness as human beings become 
conscious of their involvement in ‘humanity’ on a global scale 
(...) Durkheim anticipated the idea of political globalization 
on the basis of a universalistic notion of humanity’ (B. Turner 
1992: xxxv). The nation-state should turn away from old 
tendencies to imperialist expansion and focus on social justice 
and the full development of its citizens as Durkheim believed in 
the compatibility between a republican state and international 
harmony (Jones 2001: 60, 181; Thompson 1982: 153-4). Yet, as we 
have clearly seen, Durkheim thoroughly supported France’s war 
effort because these seemed to him the best way of defending 
these institutions and moral principles.  
 
The question of the balance between the state and the individual 
is the crucial normative tension in his political sociology. 
Durkheim’s (1973: 54) argument is that the moral authority of 
the state is based on the individuals’ moral autonomy. 
Individual rights can only arise and be granted by the state: 
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‘the stronger the State, the more the individual is respected’ 
(Durkheim: 1992: 57). The thesis is that there are no natural 
rights of the individual at the moment of birth but rather that 
these rights arise and are held only by the state ‘our moral 
individuality, far from being antagonistic to the State, has on 
the contrary been a product of it (...) the fundamental duty of 
the State is (…) to persevere in calling the individual to a 
moral way of life’ (Durkheim 1992: 68-9).  
 
Durkheim advocated for a substantive conception of freedom that 
is rooted in a combination between moral individualism and state 
republicanism. Durkheim’s moral individualism refers to 
humankind in general, not to the citizens of any specific 
nation; the state has to respect both the internal morality of 
the civil society and the external mores of foreign peoples 
(Giddens 1986: 21-3). France’s worth would be based on having 
adopted these universal values, and not that these values had to 
be defended because they expressed a particular national 
character – and neither is the case that the French are the only 
nation that can represent these values. In a rather paradoxical 
way, then, the more politically nationalistic Durkheim’s 
arguments became, the less methodologically nationalistic his 
sociological insight was. Durkheim came up with a thesis on the 
co-originality between modern ‘states’ and modern ‘individuals’ 
in which the combination of moral and sociological arguments 
produces an understanding of nation-states that transcends 
methodological nationalism. 
 
To Durkheim (1992: 72), sentiments towards one’s own nation and 
towards humanity are ‘equally high-minded kind of sentiments’ 
and he refers positively to both of them as ‘patriotism’ and 
‘world patriotism’. Durkheim also (1964: 33) claimed that our 
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current cosmopolitanism lies precisely in having understood that 
there is no opposition between the nation and humanity. Yet, 
competition among states has created and still creates 
difficulties; the feelings towards one’s own nationality and 
state can enter into conflict with the sentiments towards the 
human species as such. Durkheim’s crucial argument, however, is 
that there is no automatic opposition between nationalism and 
internationalism: ‘neither anti-patriotism nor nationalism are 
defendable positions’ (Durkheim quoted in Layne 1973: 101). 
Pacifism will only be achieved through an equilibrated relation 
between both the patrie and internationalism. He rejected the 
notion of a community of culture or an ethnic principle in the 
constitution of the nation; the question was to avoid chauvinism 
and to stay away from the doctrine of aggressiveness among 
states: ‘national exclusivism has to be excised from patriotism’ 
(Llobera 1994: 152). A patrie, comes into existence when moral 
sentiments are incorporated into the equation. Historically 
speaking, Durkheim sees the process of the constitution of 
patries as a constant enlargement of political units since the 
medieval times; and he also maintained that the patrie was not a 
community of culture, but rather it was based on a political 
bond.  
 
Normatively, human values are at the highest point of the moral 
hierarchy; these are the most general, unchangeable and even 
sublime (Durkheim 1992: 72-3). Yet, as a sociologist, Durkheim’s 
arguments were not exclusively normative; Durkheim faced equally 
the problem of grounding these abstract moral values in social, 
political and cultural practices. The reproduction of social 
life is based in the fact that individuals have to ‘live 
together’ and the abstract notion of humanity is not strong 
enough to create the social sources of morality. Durkheim’s 
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argument is twofold here. On the one hand, modern social life 
requires the creation of a bond that must be based on the idea 
of the patrie. On the other hand, if the idea of humanity is 
missing, the result will be chauvinistic nationalism instead of 
patriotism. In Durkheim’s (1992: 74-5) own words 
 
If each State had as it chief aim, not to expand, or to 
lengthen its borders, but to set its own house in order and 
to make the widest appeal to its members for a moral life on 
a ever higher level, then all discrepancy between national 
and human morals would be excluded. If the State had no 
other purpose than making men of its citizens, in the widest 
sense of the term, the civic duties would be only a 
particular form of the general obligations of humanity. It 
is this course that evolution takes, as we have already 
seen. The more societies concentrate their energies inwards, 
on the interior life, the more they will be diverted from 
the disputes that bring a clash between cosmopolitanism —or 
world patriotism, and patriotism; as they grow in size and 
get greater complexity, so will they concentrate more and 
more on themselves (...) societies can have their pride, not 
in being the greatest or the wealthiest, but in being the 
most just, the best organized and in possessing the best 
moral constitution 
 
Universal values must be anchored in ‘really-existing’ 
communities, and Durkheim thought that the nation-state was 
indeed one very important form of modern socio-political 
community. To be practical and useful, the regulation of social 
life has to be carried out within a certain scale and range and, 
so far in modernity, that scale has been provided by the nation-
state. Yet again, the ‘identity’ of the state – national 
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patriotism – must be centred on emphasising the worth of human 
values. Despite the problems in Durkheim’s formulations – for 
instance, his naivety in dealing with the relationships between 
‘altruist’ patriotism and ‘fanatic’ nationalism – Durkheim did 
not use the nation-state as the universal or necessary 
representation of society in modernity. Durkheim’s crucial 
thesis here is that the nation-state takes its normative value 
in relation and only in relation to the principles and ideals 
that have to be conceived of independently from the national 
framework. Yet, and this makes his argument even more 
interesting, a major feature of Durkheim’s sociology of the 
nation-state is that he emphasised the need for these values to 
be actualised through particular socio-political arrangements. 
 
Conclusion. Classical sociology and the opacity of the nation-
state in modernity. 
 
As sociologists, the question for us is how to make sense of the 
current transformations and challenges now affecting the nation-
state and I have argued that canon of classical sociologists can 
be good a company in the process of trying to accomplish that 
task. Yet, in the same way as this does not mean that we 
uncritically start reproducing their arguments and theorems, 
this is also a rejection of the view that their works remain of 
interest only for those interested in the history of social and 
political thought. In contradistinction to the thesis of 
classical sociology’s immanent methodological nationalism, I 
have tried to show in this article that these writers 
systematically confronted the tensions and difficulties that we 
now know have besieged all attempts at the conceptualization of 
the nation-state ever since (Billig 1995). Surely, classical 
sociologists were only partly able to deal successfully with 
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these problems. But it is none the less remarkable that these 
same complications that once were seen as the very reason behind 
their lack of understanding of the nation-state can now be 
turned upside down and become the cornerstone of a renovated 
understanding of the nation-state as a modern but not the only 
or most desirable form of socio-political arrangement. 
 
Marx, Weber and Durkheim were, in their different ways, against 
the notion that, as a concept, the nation held any explanatory or 
causal value and one key feature of classical sociology as an 
intellectual tradition was that it rejected those nationalistic 
ways of thinking that were already predominant during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Chernilo 2007b). As 
many of their contemporaries were, chauvinistically and 
nationalistically, arguing for the incommensurability national 
cultures, the particularism of national missions, and the 
salience of national Sonderwegs, classical sociologists severely 
criticised these nationalistic worldviews: these writers 
attempted to define the social – in general – rather than any 
particular national society (Frisby and Sayer 1986, Outhwaite 
2006, Turner 2006). Marx theorised on the premature decline of 
the nation-state even before it reaches maturity so that one can 
never speak of modernity as composed only of modern nation-
states; Weber commented upon the complicated connections between 
statehood and nationhood that are likely to create as many 
problems as those they were expected to solve; and Durkheim 
reflected on the agonising relationships between nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism that prevent us from distinguishing between the 
two as swiftly and neatly as we would want. Each one of them 
pointed towards a particular feature of the nation-state’s 
development that has proved crucial ever since: its historical 
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elusiveness, its sociological equivocations and its normative 
ambiguity.  
 
The difficulties of periodising the nation-state as one single 
form of socio-political arrangement does not stop bullying 
scholars interested in the field. The controversy runs somehow 
deeper than the dispute between modernism and primordialism 
within nationalism studies because the most crucial sociological 
problem seems to be not so much whether it is meaningful to 
speak of nations before modernity but whether the idea and 
reality of the nation-state has remained one and the same 
throughout modernity. With regard to time, then, we are still 
trying to grasp the nation-state’s incredible capacity to steer 
modernization processes and to reaffirm its loyalty to its own 
past and revered tradition all at once. Similarly, the question 
of the equivocal relationships between the nation and the state 
lies at the heart of the current representation of the world as 
neatly divided in nearly 200 formally equal political and 
administrative units. The problem is apparent here not only 
because of the obvious disparities in the ability to mobilise 
power and all kinds of resources among those units but more 
crucially because such a representation simply prevents us from 
capturing the actual internal and external polices that had to 
be put in place for nation-states to forge their beloved but 
rather mythical harmony and unity. We now know that in creating 
themselves nation-states have consistently been divided, say, 
along ethnic and class lines so that disputes and struggles seem 
to have been the norm and not the exception. And finally, we 
seem to be growing increasingly accustomed to the fact that, 
normatively speaking, all claims to national sovereignty and 
self-determination require for its actual operation of the 
implicit assumption of a wider conception of human rights and 
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the equal dignity of all human beings. We have become aware that 
there is a paradox underlying any affirmation of national 
autonomy because such a claim can only be granted if the group 
in question is equally prepared to recognise a similar dignity 
to all other peoples on earth who may eventually be interested 
in following a similar route towards national independence. The 
simple but relevant result of this almost trivial comment is 
that a rather thick conception of human rights underwrites all 
attempts at national autonomy: nationalism and cosmopolitanism; 
national self-determination and human rights are just two sides 
of the same coin. In my view, these are all issues and themes 
that can hardly be regarded as irrelevant or outdated for our 
times. And the canon of classical sociology may provide us with 
much required antidotes against the fallacy of presentism that 
effectively finds in any new event the beginning of a new epoch; 
against any simplistic accommodation between an equal right to 
self-determination for all nations and the actual ability to 
exercise this right for all states; and indeed against the 
naiveté with which normative ideals are flagged up only to find 
out then the lack of consistency with which they are deployed 
into the real world (Fine and Chernilo 2004). The nation-state’s 
history, main features and legacy in modernity has proved 
elusive, equivocal and ambiguous in a way that classical 
sociology seems more able to capture and subtle to grasp than 
previously granted (Chernilo 2007a, Delanty and Kumar 2006).  
 
The key lesson of the work of classical sociologists on this 
theme is that precisely because they were not obsessed with 
justifying the nation-state as the only or most developed form of 
socio-political arrangement in modernity their actual 
conceptualisation of the nation-state was, to an important extent 
at least, able to transcend any nationalistic framework. They 
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seem to have understood that in modernity, arguably, only the 
nation-state has had such troubled history, has been conceptually 
so equivocal and has left such an ambivalent normative legacy. 
Even if we account for the historical inaccuracies, conceptual 
deficiencies and normative contradictions in their works, the 
argument remains that classical social theory saw the nation-
state as a historical formation in the making and maintained no 
idea of its necessary generalisation as a socio-political 
arrangement. In highlighting some aspects in each of their 
theorisation of the nation-state, then, a re-interpretation of 
the history, legacy, and main features of the nation-state in 
modernity has started to emerge.  
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